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Abstract 
The largest fresh meat brand names in Spain are analyzed here to study how quality is 
signaled in agribusiness and how the underlying quality-assurance organizations work. 
Results show, first, that organizational form varies according to the specialization of the 
brand name. Publicly-controlled brand names are grounded on market contracting with 
individual producers, providing stronger incentives. In contrast, private brands rely 
more on hierarchy, taking advantage of its superiority in solving specific coordination 
problems. Second, the seemingly redundant coexistence of several quality indicators for 
a given product is explained in efficiency terms. Multiple brands are shown to be 
complementary, given their specialization in guaranteeing different attributes of the 
product.  
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1. Introduction 
Brand names have become surprisingly important in the fresh meat market. Fresh meat 
has traditionally been sold mainly without brand name. However, 5-10% out of the 
fresh meat is now sold as quality meat.1 In this, up to three simultaneous brand names 
are used, referring meat’s origin and quality. It seems, therefore, that brands have 
replaced the traditional butcher’s role in guaranteeing meat quality with his own 
reputation. This is probably due to two causes. First, the increase in the opportunity cost 
of the traditional housewife has changed shopping habits from the traditional butcher 
model towards the supermarket and hypermarket model.2 Second, health scares such as 
the “BSE crisis”, the “Belgium chickens” or the “foot-and-mouth disease fever” are just 
some of the terms which European consumers associate with fraud in meat products in 
the last five years. In fact, although total fresh meat consumption has increased by 1.4% 
from 1994 to 1999, beef and chicken consumption have decreased in 9% and 7%, 
respectively.3 Consequently, brand names have become the main quality signal for 
consumers, motivating the establishment of numerous new brands.  
Those brand names differ substantially among them. On one side, they signal different 
dimensions of quality. In fact, some of them do not indicate “high quality” attributes, 
                                                                 
1 Internal estimations of Empresa Asturiana de Servicios Agrarios for 1999. 
2 In 1994, purchases of fresh meat in major retail outlets (supermarkets and hypermarkets) were 
at 47.85%, rising to 49.19% in 1999. Likewise, shopping in traditional shops decreased in the 
same period from 41.26% to 38.27% (MAPYA, 2000, p. 207). The same tendencies have been 
maintained since the eighties.  
3 MAPYA (2000, pp. 59-60). 
  1but only the homogeneity of their products. In this sense, it is not difficult to find 
reputable brand names in which awareness comes mainly from the homogeneity of the 
product instead of its organoleptic attributes (McDonalds’ hamburgers could be an 
example). On the other side we can differentiate two types of brand names, depending 
on who guarantees the quality. First, when the guarantee comes from a private firm, the 
quality signal is the typical private brand name. For example, in agribusiness, it is 
frequent that the distribution companies, usually the larger ones, launch their own 
brands, guaranteeing product quality themselves (such as the Spanish “Corte Inglés” or 
the French “Carrefour”).4 A variation of this type of brand name comes about when a 
well-reputed company is hired to guarantee consumers the quality of other product. This 
is the case of the of quality certificates, such as those of Lloyds or AENOR, which 
guarantee to the consumer that the producer follows certain rules and procedures to 
detect and avoid bad quality output. Second, a public or governmental institution can 
guarantee consumers the quality of the product. It is when a company sells its product 
sheltered by the prestige of some specific geographical spheres and/or production 
methods related to a superior product quality. In this case, we refer to this quality signal 
as “Geographical Indicators” from here on out, including Protected Denomination of 
Origin (PDO),5 Protected Geographical Indicator (PGI) and the Guarantee Brand Name. 
Although there are some differences among them regarding the degree of exclusiveness 
within a territory, all are brand names protected by the European Union.6 Both 
                                                                 
4 The owner can also adopt other legal forms, such as co-operatives or associations of 
producers. In those hybrid cases the only difference lies in the collective ownership of the brand 
name that guarantee the quality to the consumers. 
5 See on this, Castillo (2002).  
6 The process undergone by a hypothetical product with denomination could be as follows: an 
Autonomous Region grants the Guarantee Brand Name. The product is therefore accepted 
  2categories of brand names, private and public, are however nonexclusive, overlapping 
subsets: we observe that one single product could be retailed with more than one brand 
name.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. On one hand we want to analyze which mechanisms of 
governance are used to solve different dimensions of the information asymmetry (high 
attributes and their homogeneity). On the other hand, we want to explain the economic 
rationale of “co-branding”: the concurrence of more than one brand name on the same 
product.7 
The remaining of the article is organized as follows. First, we describe the typical 
problems and solutions involved in guaranteeing the quality of products. Section three 
defines our two hypotheses: First, the mechanisms of governance chosen to manage a 
brand name will depend on the objective of each brand. Second, the different types of 
brands that we observe are complementary in assuring quality. These hypotheses are 
tested using six case studies, which are described in section four. The empirical test is 
discussed in section five. Section six concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
within the regional territory. As long as the product is suitable, the Autonomous Region 
proposes it as a Specific Denomination or as Denomination of Origin, depending on the nature 
of the product, being confirmed by the Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación 
(Spanish Ministry of Agriculture). In this case, the product is accepted at both the national and 
international levels. To be a product with a Specific Denomination or Denomination of Origin, 
the product does not have to have first been a product with a Guarantee Brand Name. The 
products recognized by the Spanish nation are also recognized by the EU as products with a 
Protected Geographical Indicator, Protected Denomination of Origin or Guaranteed Traditional 
Specialty. 
7 Co-branding is not exclusive of agrifood products. Credit cards and computers are other well-
known examples. See Blackett and Boad (1999) for an extensive overview on this topic. 
  32. Quality Assurance  
2.1. The Problem  
The problem of quality lies in the fact that the consumer cannot always determine the 
quality level of a product before purchasing it. This information asymmetry increases 
the chances of opportunism,8 which can even prevent the transaction from taking place.9 
The intensity of this problem depends on the characteristics of the product. On this 
subject, three types of product attributes that determine their potential controversial 
nature have been identified: search, experience and confidence,10 of which only search 
attributes can be determined before purchasing. The larger the influence of experience 
and confidence attributes into the consumer utility function, the bigger will be the 
information asymmetry problem and the more interested the producer will be in 
assuring the product’s real quality.  
On the other hand, the information asymmetry of a product’s quality presents two 
dimensions: the average or expected quality of a producer or brand and the deviation of 
each product from that average value.  
The first dimension refers to the qualities consumers may notice in the different 
attributes that form the product and the way they value them. This is often called 
“subjective” or “design” quality and is related to the degree to which they satisfy the 
                                                                 
8 See, for example, Williamson (1985, pp. 47-48). 
9 See, for example, Akerlof’s classic work (1970). 
10 See Nelson (1970) and Darby and Karni (1973). 
  4customer’s preferences.11 They usually coincide with the more limited and difficult-to-
obtain attributes, at least among regular or experienced consumers. Agrifood products 
are no exception, and although it is commonly said that “there is no accounting for 
taste”, consumer preferences are far from being determined by chance, usually 
concentrating on well-known and defined organoleptic characteristics. 
The second quality dimension refers to the homogeneity between products of the same 
producer, or protected by the same brand. This dimension is related to the degree to 
which the pre-established design conditions are observed and is often called “objective” 
or “conformance” quality.12 In the agrifood sector, these aspects were not traditionally 
of concern, and were more typical of industrial products than of agricultural or cattle 
products. However, the success of products considered as low-quality at first but very 
homogeneous—such as hamburgers and sausages—shows the importance that the 
consumer of foodstuffs gives to being sure about the quality of the products purchased, 
regardless of their organoleptic attributes. Nevertheless, this difficulty has a 
technological origin since it is hard to know how the different variables affect the final 
quality of the product. This makes homogeneity one of the main concerns for producers.  
2.2. The Solution 
The most common way of solving the problems caused by informational asymmetry on 
quality is that the informed party (the producer) signals its private information by 
adopting a behavior (by investing in brand name) that, properly interpreted, reveals their 
information to the non informed party (the consumer). This signaling involves 
                                                                 
11 See Edwards (1968). 
  5committing the quasi-rent from his reputational capital in every exchange.13 In this 
sense, the producer must first create a reputation for his brand name in order to be able 
to use it later as a guarantee. For that purpose, he must start offering high quality in 
repeated transactions. Only in that way, after repeated purchases of experimented or 
confidence goods, will consumers gradually realize that the quality offered is suitable 
and consistent with the passing of time, being confident that they will not be deceived. 
In exchange for that superior quality, consumers are willing to gradually pay for that 
brand name a price increase or “premium” with regard to other products that have not 
been signaled and do not offer these guarantees. 
In perfect competitive markets, this premium represent the normal profitability of the 
investment made by the company in its reputational capital, and will depend on the 
problems it resolves for the consumer. Thus, it is likely that the consumer dislikes both 
a low average quality of the products and a high deviation from expected or mean 
quality. Thus, a high average quality would imply that the consumer is willing to pay a 
positive “quality premium”, and a low variance from that mean would cause a 
“homogeneity premium” (see Table 1).  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
12 See Crosby (1979, p.15). 
13 See Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) for two pioneer models of this process.  
  6Table 1: Quality Premiums in Agrifood Products 
Subjective quality (organoleptic attributes) 
 
superior Standard 
High  Ideal situation: “quality premium” 
plus “homogeneity premium” 




Low  “Quality premium” (but no 
“homogeneity premium”) 
The worst situation: neither “quality 




The combination of quality premiums, the specificity of reputational capital and 
repeated transactions make the producer's signaling credible. Consumers know that if 
they are deceived, the present value of the company’s reputational capital decreases 
because its future transactions would be endangered if their clients do not trust them. 
The business of the producer is not to take advantage in a short-run, but to obtain 
“normal” profits from his investments from many long-run exchanges. In other words, 
the producer would lose the value of his quasi-rents, generated from the investments 
made to create his reputation. 
3. Hypotheses 
3.1. Specialization and Contract Design 
Our first hypothesis argues that depending on the objective of each brand name in 
solving quality problems (low mean quality and product heterogeneity), the mechanisms 
  7of governance selected and the contract design will be different. Brands that place more 
emphasis on the homogeneity of the product (i.e. they are seeking to reduce the variance 
of the attributes of the product) display governance mechanisms similar to hierarchies. 
Conversely, those that attempt to guarantee mainly the average characteristics of the 
brand are more likely to be based on the market.  
The theoretical justification for this argument is based on the conjecture that some 
mechanisms are more appropriate for solving coordination problems (hierarchies) while 
others are for solving motivation problems (markets). Where the aim is to obtain a 
homogeneous product, the chief goal is a good coordination of inputs, even more than 
having a perfectly designed product or the avoidance of small local imbalances in the 
inputs. For this kind of decision, in which the main problem is the timely 
synchronization of activities and resources, transaction cost literature argues that it is 
more costly to coordinate activities through the market than through hierarchy.14 On one 
hand, probably the best information about coordination is only available to the party that 
is central to all the other agents involved. However, in order to make the market work, it 
would be necessary to transmit all that key information to each decision-maker and this 
would entail important transfer costs. On the other hand, it is also feasible that the 
reaction of each agent to changes in prices would depend on their wealth and risk 
preferences, hindering the coordination goal. 
The market offers better results when the characteristics sought are not so much the 
coordination and homogeneity as the superiority of the specific organoleptic attributes. 
In this case, the relevant information (how to obtain the best attributes) does not come 
                                                                 
14 See Williamson (1985 and 1991) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990 and 1992, pp. 91-92). 
  8from this central party, but is dispersed throughout the organization or even among the 
different producers (the specific know-how of each producer). Moreover, in this case, 
according to the theory of incentives, it is possible to offer internal incentives to the 
different agents so that they feel appropriately motivated to seek these attributes. Market 
transactions usually provide this kind of incentive. 
We can also anticipate the characteristics of the contracts used in these two types of 
transactions. We expect more complete contracts in those brands that aim mainly at 
homogenous products, since it is necessary that the performance of each agent be 
precise and coordinated. This requires detailed performance guidelines for the parties, 
whether they are employees or external business associates. On the contrary, when the 
objective of the brand is a high subjective quality based on organoleptic attributes, it is 
common to use relatively incomplete contracts, in which only general performance 
guidelines and the mechanisms for solving problems are established, without specifying 
ex ante specific performances.  
On the other hand, the decision-making capacity of the agents will be much higher for 
those brands that seek the superiority of their organoleptic attributes than for those that 
try to guarantee a homogeneous product. In the first ones, specific local knowledge is 
fundamental in order to develop high-quality products. This is difficult to transmit given 
the great variety of conditions each farming enterprise has to face. On the contrary, 
when the basic aim is to guarantee the homogeneity of a product, all the agents must act 
in coordination in order to offer identical answers to the same problems. 
  93.2. Complementarities between Geographical Indicators and Private Brand 
Names 
Products with a Geographical Indicator also show the brand name of the associated 
producer. This coexistence of quality signals raises a question about its economic 
rationality, specially when they are compared with a product with just a private brand 
name. There seems to be a redundancy in those two quality signals—the Geographical 
Indicator and the name of the producer—, missing the economies of scale that could be 
reached by using only one. It is frequently asserted that the most important benefits of 
brand extension —the introduction of a new product under a well known brand name—
against the decision to launch a new brand are the lower costs to build-up awareness, 
achieve the target trial levels and communication efficiencies.15 Consequently, why do 
we observe several brands for the same product within geographical indicator schemes?  
Our hypothesis is that the different brands we observe are complementary in assuring 
quality and, therefore, are not redundant. On the contrary, an investment in one of the 
brands increases the value of the others, a situation from which a private brand could 
benefit. The reason for this complementary lies in the specialization of functions which 
gives rise to an ideal assignment of property rights over the different attributes or 
dimensions of quality. This could make up for the possible advantages of using only one 
brand. 
                                                                 
15 See, for instance, Keller (1998, p. 455) and Ambler and Styles (1997, p. 224), and their 
references to empirical studies on the matter. 
  10To understand this point requires, first, explaining that Geographical Indicators provide 
a safeguard against the expropriation of specific investments.16 Hypothetically, if all 
producers in an area were allowed to use the geographical name (i.e., if property rights 
on those names remain in the public domain), there would not be any incentive to invest 
neither in the reputational capital of that geographical name nor in associated private 
brand names. The reason is that the investments could be easily expropriated. The 
answer is the creation of a legal independent entity, the Geographical Indicator. This 
entity then holds the property rights on that geographical reference. This protects both 
the producers who use that brand as the basis of their own reputation and the reputation 
of the geographical name itself.  
On one hand, producers are interested in punishing those of them who do not abide by 
the quality standards. Thus, the value of the geographic name is protected from damage, 
enhancing the investments of the associated producers in their own brand names. These 
latter investments are specific to the continuity of the Geographical Indicator on which 
they are based. They, therefore, can be expropriated by other producers, a problem 
mostly absent for products sold under a private brand.   
On the other hand, producers are also interested in separating the control of the 
Geographical Indicator from its management. In their analysis of hierarchies, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) find that a common pattern consists of dividing the decision process in a 
way that management and control functions are separated in different individuals unless 
they are compensated with the residual rent. This allocation of functions applies, for 
instance, to the separation of ownership and control in open corporations. Its main 
                                                                 
16 The analysis of asset specificity was pioneered by Williamson (1975 and 1979) and Klein, 
  11advantage is to contain the moral hazard plaguing any agency relationship, developing a 
special kind of specialization: managers act as decision controllers and are themselves 
controlled by other managers, in a hierarchical fashion, and, eventually, by owners paid 
with the residual rent. 
The Fama and Jensen framework is applicable to our case. Geographical Indicators play 
the role of decision controllers, whereas private brands adhering to them are equivalent 
to managers. Thus, owners would care that private producers do not expropriate the 
investments they have made in the reputational capital of the Geographical Indicator. 
Otherwise, producers would be interested in doing so because they would not have to 
totally sustain the cost of their decisions. For example, when selling under the same 
geographical name, if a private brand lowers the quality of its product, it would totally 
benefit from the cost savings. The negative consequences, however, would be shared 
among all the producers who used that geographical reference in their brand name. 
4. Case Description 
The production process of fresh meat begins with the breeding of the different animal 
species and breeds, fed in farming enterprises until they reach the appropriate slaughter 
age (variable according to the species, breed and type of meat). Slaughtering can only 
be done in centers authorized by the health authorities, called slaughterhouses. The 
resulting product, the carcass, is carried to the quartering rooms where it is cut into 
quarters. Finally, the distributors carry out the final cutting work and presentation once 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Crawford and Alchian (1978). 
  12the product has reached its optimum point of maturity after the pertinent airing 
(distributed among the slaughter houses, the refrigerating rooms and the distributors). 
Figure 1 represents the different phases in the supply chain of fresh meat.  
 
Figure 1: Supply Chain of Fresh Meat 
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The maturing period and the breed are probably the most important factors determining 
the organoleptic characteristics. The reason is that, according to some studies, the most 
valued characteristic by consumers and what most affects future purchases is the 
tenderness (Barton-Gade, Cross, Jons and Winger, 1988; Monin, 1991 and Love, 1994). 
Conducted studies show that the beef appreciated by tasters is more sensible to the 
period of meat maturing than to the own breed. In fact, the tasters do not appreciate 
differences among breeds when maturing periods are long enough (more than 21 
  13days).17 However, breed significantly affects the tenderness in short maturing periods. 
Color is another valued characteristic in beef (Barton-Gade, Cross, Jons and Winger, 
1988; Monin, 1991). In this case, breed is probably the main factor determining the 
color but the problem is that there is no clear preference for any color: in France red 
meat is valued higher than in Spain, where pink meat is associated with tender, fresh 
and natural meat.18  
4.1. The sample 
The test of the hypotheses presented in the previous section has been carried out on a 
sample of quality sign cases (different brand names) in the fresh beef sector. The cases 
were selected with a double objective. First, the sample had to be representative of the 
market quality signals. In this sense, our sample represent 65% of the whole labeled 
beef sold in Spain in 1999.19 Second, we tried to include all types of brand names, from 
private brand names to the different types of geographical indicators, such as PGI and 
Guarantee Brand Name).20 On the one side, we have selected three out of the four 
private brand names which operate at national level (Calicarne,  Calidad Tradición 
Carrefour, and Corporación Alimentaria Guissona). Their market share (the three 
brands) is around 80% of private beef brand names. The first, Calicarne is a pseudonym 
                                                                 
17 See Campo et al. (1999, p. 387). 
18 See Fernández (1991) and Sañudo et al. (1999). According to these studies, the belief that 
older animals have more red meat is inaccurate. 
19 We have estimated that all labeled beef is around 8.2% out of total beef consumption in 
Spain in 1999. EASA, a Spanish agricultural consultant firm had estimated 5% in 1998. 
20 Based on the Sylvander’s Classification (1995), we have left only one aspect uncovered, 
specifically the UNE, ISO, NE standards or the health and industrial standards. However, these 
brands are present in the majority of the main economic agents that take part in the sample 
brands. 
  14for a beef brand name launched in 1994 by the third distributor in Spain. The sales of 
this quality signal in 1999 were 35,000 carcasses (around 6,860 tons), distributed at the 
74 integrated sales points of the firm. The second, Calidad Tradición Carrefour (CTC), 
is a brand name of the biggest distributor in Spain (Carrefour). Actually, it is an 
umbrella name used from 1994 in Spain (in France since 1991), which includes several 
healthy, tasteful and environmentally friendly products. As for beef, 8,000 carcasses 
(around 1,570 tons) of this quality signal were sold in the 112 hypermarkets that 
Carrefour holds in Spain in 1999. Finally, Corporación  Alimentaria de Guissona 
(CAG) is a new close corporation (established in December 1999) owned by the 
cooperative Agropecuaria de Guissona. An idea of the relevance of this brand name can 
be given by the 23,000 calves slaughtered (around 4,508 tm) in the year 2000 (added to 
630,000 pigs, 104,000 lambs, 18.4 million chickens, 1 million turkeys, 6 million quails 
and 228,000 hens), sold to other national distributors or to its 165 national outlets (most 
of them franchised).21 
On the other side, we have selected the biggest and most aware geographical indicator 
in each category: Ternera Gallega as an IGP and Ternera Asturiana as a Guarantee 
Brand Name. We have also considered a small IGP, Carne de Morucha de Salamanca, 
in order to control the influence of size. The first, Ternera Gallega, has been considered 
as a PGI since December 1996 and it is the biggest non-private brand name in Spain. Its 
9,967 associated producers yielded 7,291 tm (37,780 carcasses) of beef in 1999, selling 
all around Spain. Ternera Asturiana is the new brand name of Carne de Asturias 
Calidad Controlada that is a Guarantee Brand Name officially recognized in the 
                                                                 
21 Source: personal interviews with product managers of the companies.  
  15Principality of Asturias since 1996. Its sales were 3,917 tm (15,546 carcasses) in 1999, 
involving 8,626 associated producers. Finally, Carne de Morucha de Salamanca has 
also received the official recognition as PGI from the EU since June 1996. It is the 
smallest Spanish IGP, selling 177 tm. (625 carcasses) of beef in 1999.22  
The main production aspects explicitly controlled by each brand are summarized in 
Table 2. It seems clear that the goals sought by both types of brands (private vs. 
geographical indicators) differ significantly. First, geographical indicators put special 
emphasis on aspects such as the selection of the best breeds and their characteristics, the 
health inspections during the entire process and the natural feed and suckle. The final 
goal of all these elements is to achieve higher organoleptic characteristics. However, 
private brands put more emphasis on another type of attributes, such us maturing, 
filleting, packaging and price. In this sense, although they do not neglect the 
organoleptic attributes (especially the retailers’ brand names: CTC and Calicarne), their 
main concern is that their products are homogeneous through time and for the different 
production batches.  
                                                                 
22 Sources: Regulatory Council of the Geographical indicators and www.mapya.es (accessed 
March 19, 2002).  
  16Table 2: Main Production Aspects Explicitly Controlled by the Owner 










Calicarne  Guissona 
(CAG) 
Breed and Origin  √  √  √  No No No 
Natural Feeding  √  √  √  √  √  No 
Natural sucking  √  √  √  No No No 
Slaughtering  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Maturing  (conditions)  No No No  √  √  √ 
Price  No No No  √  √  √ 
Presentation (filleting 
and packaging)   No No No  √  √  √ 
Traceability  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
 
Finally, pricing policy is another important field with substantial differences among 
selected brand names. Table 3 shows these differences by type of product. We observe 
that prices of Geographical Indicators are always higher than prices of private brand 
names. Additionally, price differences within each category are narrower than between 
categories. 
  17Table 3: Price Per Kilogram (€) of Different Beef Brand Names 
  Geographical indicators Private  brands 
Product  Ternera 
Gallega 
Ternera 
Asturiana  Average Calicarne  CTC  CAG  Average 
Steaks  18,91  16,2 17,56 15,6 11,63 9,98 12,40 
Stew meat  10,13  8,38 9,26 7,38 6,65 5,79 6,61 
Average  14,52 12,29  13,41  11,49  9,14  7,89  9,51 
Source: Consumer prices at March 19
th, 2002. Data come from web site of Carrefour (www.carrefour.es, 
accessed March 19, 2002) for Ternera Gallega and CTC prices, web site of Corporación Alimentaria 
Guissona (www.cag.es, accessed March 19, 2002) for CAG prices, and stores of Calicarne for Calicarne 
and Ternera Asturiana. 
 
4.2. Mechanisms of Governance and Organizational Patterns 
Although the product is always beef, the underlying organizations behind each brand 
name are substantially different. We have clustered all quality signals in two categories, 
according to type of owner (private or public). The reason is that geographical 
indicators display many similarities among themselves and they can be analyzed 
altogether. Agents and institutions which take part in a typical geographic indicator are 
summarized in Figure 2. On the other hand, we have clustered all the private brand 
names, despite being a bit more different.  
  18Geographical Indicators 
We can easily distinguish two types of participants within a geographical indicator. On 
one hand, the economic agents related to meat production, distribution and marketing 
and, on the other hand, the companies and institutions related to the control and 
regulation of all those activities. Thus, the ownership of the production factors and the 
quality control of the final product of geographical indicators are clearly separated. That 
is to say, while independent entrepreneurs are the owners of the production resources, 
brand control is carried out by independent institutions. 























































































































































































  19The first agents, companies that take part directly in the production process, have to be 
authorized to use the geographical indicator by the seconds, particularly the Regulatory 
Council. The granting of that authorization is conditional on the fulfillment of the 
requirements stipulated in the brand usage regulations, which focus mainly on technical 
and health aspects and on a higher control of the animals that are going to be labeled 
with the Geographical Indicator. Once those requirements are fulfilled, each company 
(especially producers) applies its own experience to the production and sells to other 
agents employing its own name. At the end, the consumer could see up to four brand 
names: the geographical indicator and the names of the producer, the slaughterhouse 
and the retailer. This is because only the biggest producers vertically integrate other 
production stages and, even this type of producers are not big enough to reach 
awareness as a private brand name.  
Within the institutions in charge of the control and regulation of the geographical 
indicator, the Regulatory Council is the most important. The Government, the real 
owner, delegates to this entity the rights of admission, exclusion and penalty of its 
participants. It plays a triple role. Firstly, it is in charge of the elaboration and approval 
of the technical rules. Secondly, it is in charge of assuring that all the agents protected 
by the brand name abide by the regulations, guaranteeing that the product remains in 
line with the pre-established quality standards in every phase of the production process. 
Although this monitoring control is normally subcontracted to an independent and 
specialized firm, Regulatory Council employees also carry out this monitoring task. 
Finally, Regulatory Council deals with all the brand promotion and development 
activities. 
  20Private Brand Names 
Private quality signals present a simpler organization of agents and institutions than the 
geographical indicators. The reason is, first, that the Administration is not directly 
present and, second, that the owners of the brand name are also involved in the 
production process, being also more vertically integrated than associated producers in 
the Geographical Indicators. We can also differentiate two types of organizations. First, 
CAG was in its origin the typical cooperative of producers which decided to forward 
integrate all the production stages in different types of fresh meat (beef included). 
Second, Calicarne and CTC are the other way round. Owners of both quality signs were 
among the biggest food distributors in Spain, who decided to backward quasi-integrate 
other stages of the production process in different fresh products.23 Figure 3 summarize 
those differences. 
On one hand, CAG actively intervenes in the whole production process. Thus, although 
its main areas of competence are feed production and livestock breeding, the company 
also fattens, slaughters and sells the animals. First, cooperative partners produce feeds, 
following the CAG’s procedures and directions, and fatten up the calves. Second, the 
company owns its own slaughterhouses. Third, some slaughtered animals are 
transformed in the company facilities and finally, the distribution and marketing (fresh 
and transformed meat) is largely carried out by its own refrigerated fleet, cash-sales 
                                                                 
23 Quasi-integration is based here more on the length and duration and interaction of the 
transaction, as in Blois (1972), Dietrich (1994) and Fernandez, Arruñada and González-Díaz 
(2000), than on asset ownership, as in Monteverde and Teece (1982) and Masten, Meehan, and 
Snyder (1989). Both dimensions of quasi-integration refer to a kind of hybrid form for 
Williamson (1991). 
  21rooms and the network of stores Area de Guissona (AGSA). In short, CAG is now a 
highly centralized company with a high degree of vertical integration. 
The two main actors taking part in the CAG are the cooperative and the producers-
members. Within the latter, we can differentiate two types of members, called “free” 
and “integrated” members. The first one, the minority, represents the traditional case. 
They fatten their own livestock and “make use” of the cooperative to sell, without being 
obliged to do so (they may sell direct to the market if they get better prices). The 
integrated members represent the nucleus of CAG. They fatten livestock owned by the 
cooperative under conditions stipulated in a contract that individually binds each partner 
to the cooperative. The control of tasks focuses on “subcontracted“ activities: the 
fattening. The control of other activities is mainly internalized by means of the 
requirements of the ISO 9002 standards. Moreover, the ISO standards require an 
auditory put into effect periodically for an independent and specialized firm. Control of 
AGSA stores is carried out by studying the degree of customer satisfaction by means of 
surveys and claim analyses. 
The other two quality signal, Calicarne and CTC, are slightly different from CAG but 
similar between them. The owners of both brand names establish long term agreements 
with all backward firms in the supply chain: cattle breeders, slaughterhouses and 
wholesalers. Although they are legally independent firms and they do not sign the 
exclusiveness, the relationship with the owner of the quality signal is tight: they have to 
adapt their facilities, the way of fattening up the animals, the feeds and, in general, 
everything to the long and detailed brand name specifications. The owners are in charge 
of monitoring all the process and of commercialization (filleting, packaging, labeling 
  22and fixing prices). This quality control of the brands is both internal and external. The 
former is done through direct and random supervision of cattle breeders, 
slaughterhouses and wholesalers by owners’ employees. On the other hand, distributors 
also control all stages of the production process subcontracting this task to an 
independent and specialized firm (Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) in both 
cases). 
 










































































































  234.3. Characteristics of Contracts 
Geographical Indicators 
Formal contracts backing transactions between parties in Geographical Indicators are, in 
general terms, little used and are relational in nature, leaving basic aspects such as price 
and quantity to negotiation (see Table 4). Nevertheless, we may distinguish between 
two types of contracts from the formalization point of view. On one hand, the owner of 
the brand name (normally the local government or a delegated entity such a Regulatory 
Council) formalize its relationship with all the participants in the supply chain. So, they 
must enter into a written adhesion contract and obey every rule included in the 
Geographical Indicator usage regulation. The second type of contract, those among the 
supply chain members, are less detailed and are generally not written, even though the 
relationship is long term. In general, the market determines the price. Supply and 
demand at each moment, as well as animal quality and category, determine the price per 
kilo. Agreements between the distributors (usually small) and the producers  are 
variable, in quantities (distributors do not buy everything offered) as well as in prices 
(they do not necessarily maintain prices from one day to another). Likewise, distributors 
are flexible in relation to price adjustments in quality (not every calf of a specific breed 
is equally good). 














Formalization  Null Occasionally  Occasionally  Occasionally Null/Occasionally 














Price  Market Market  Market  Market Market 
Quantity  Variable Variable  Variable  Variable Variable 
Commitment on 
Specifications  Natural content  Conformation  Conformation  Conformation  Stabling, feed, 
airing 
Quality control  Regulatory 
Council  Regulatory Council Regulatory Council Regulatory Council  Regulatory 
Council 
Termination  At will  At will  At will  At will  At will 
 
  25Private Brands 
Contracts in private brand name organizations are slightly different. The main 
difference is that contracts are much more detailed and complete, even though some 
times are not formalized. Additionally, the owner of the brand is always the central 
point of the organization. When they are integrated, as in CAG, the owner elaborates the 
procedures and directions that must be observed by all the participants (employees and 
partners) in the supply chain. However, when the organization is hybrid, as in Calicarne 
and CTC, the owner is the common part to all contracts with each participant in the 
supply chain. This means that, for example, the relationship between a cattle breeder 
and a slaughterhouse is through the owner, never directly. 
Both Calicarne and CTC write down a long and detailed list of specifications for the 
raw materials, the production process and the final products. These specifications must 
be observed by all the providers (cattle breeders and/or wholesalers), who the owner 
establish long term written contracts with (six and four suppliers respectively). Once 
agreements are established, the distributors only negotiate with those wholesalers or 
cattle breeders. These can also subcontract with other cattle breeders and 
slaughterhouses. There are, however, details that are not fixed in the agreement. For 
example, price and quantity are determined at the moment of exchange, depending on 
market conditions. However, price and quantity fluctuations are sometimes attenuated, i. 
e. this risk is shared among all the participants. In this sense, CTC guarantees a price to 
its suppliers to avoid losses or even a bankrupt on its small (comparing with the 
financial capacity of Carrefour) providers. Calicarne does not hold this purchase 
commitment, but it has kept its relationship with all the wholesalers despite the BSE 
  26crisis. Finally, a contract sometimes became a tripartite agreement because both a cattle 
breeder/ wholesaler and a slaughterhouse agree altogether in a transaction. Table 5 
summarizes the main characteristics of those contracts.24 
CAG contracts are hardly different from those of CTC and Calicarne, even though 
market contracts are only present between the co-operative and the integrated partners 
(for breeding and fattening). The remaining activities are vertically integrated. These 
contracts present the same characteristics as in the other private brands: there is a list of 
specifications which always have to be complied with and other details which are 
negotiated on a regular basis. The distinctive feature in CAG is that there is a menu of 
contracts, which offer different combinations of risk and price between the stockbreeder 
(an integrated partner) and the cooperative. These risks are basically the possibility of 
some setback (outside the efforts of the actors) during breeding and fattening, and 
market price fluctuation of products. The different kinds of contracts are analogous in 
the definition of rights and duties of parties but they differ in the payment form to the 
stockbreeder, with very different formulas (see Table 6). The different contracts 
contemplate specific aspects, such as payment of pre-established fixed prices to a 
progressive liquidation system. The latter has a medium-term horizon that lessens the 
impact of market price fluctuations. In any case, every contract is settled in writing. Not 
every contract possibility is used for all livestock species, especially the simplest kinds 
of contracts. The choice of contract type depends, to a great extent, on the 
characteristics of each species and the activity (breeding or fattening). Thus, in pig, calf 
and chicken fattening (the ones that involve more risk, especially the first ones), 
                                                                 
24 Carrefour buys all the marked animals to its suppliers, but not all of them for CTC brand. If 
  27contracts where the cooperative assumes more risk are common. In the majority of 
contracts duration is indefinite, its cancellation being subject to advance notice. 
 









Formalization  Written Written  Written 
Object  Meat  Carcasses  Calves or carcasses 
Frequency  Long term  Long term  Long term 




Market/ Minimum profit 
guaranteed 
Quantity  Variable/ Fixed  Variable  Variable 
Commitment on 
Specifications 




















Termination  Settled date  Settled date  Settled date 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
the animal overpasses the adequate age it is bought as a yearling at a lower price than if it was a 
CTC product. 
  28Table 6: Rights and obligations of the parties in CAG contracts 
Cooperative Integrated  partner 
•  Obtaining and supplying brood herds to 
members (preestablished number of units for 
each individual case). 
•  In some cases, breed and sex of animals 
supplied may be decided by the cooperative. 
•  Supply of feed, vaccines, medicines, 
technical monitoring and management rules. 
•  Livestock withdrawal. The number 
withdrawn must agree with the Control 
Sheet (members cannot sell or transfer 
livestock to third parties). 
•  Responsibility of deaths during transport, 
unless they are produced because of 
disorders or diseases. 
•  Livestock weighing. 
•  Choice of the most suitable destination for 
the livestock. 
•  Control Sheet where every delivery, incident 
and livestock death is shown. Revised 
periodically by the cooperative.  
•  Commitment to not feed livestock with any 
product except for the ones supplied or 
recommended by the cooperative, as well as 
following the management standards, 
vaccination and treatments recommended by 
it. 
•  Maintenance of facilities in good condition. 
Cleaning and disinfecting after each herd 
removal. 
•  Availability and maximum collaboration in 
withdrawal. 
 
5. Discussion of Hypotheses  
Our first hypothesis states that Geographical Indicators should make use of the market 
as the main mechanism of governance, whereas private brand names should be 
organized more like a hierarchy. Consistent with this hypothesis, we observe that 
Calicarne,  CTC and CAG are centralized organizations, whereas Ternera Gallega, 
Ternera  Asturiana and Morucha are much more decentralized. On one hand, CAG 
integrate many stages of the production process, being its own employees who do all the 
tasks. Furthermore, non-integrated activities are rigorously described in quite complete 
  29contracts, which must be fulfilled by suppliers (Table 6). As for the CTC and Calicarne, 
the discretion of the supply providers (wholesalers, stockbreeders and slaughterhouses) 
is also minimum, because contracts are very detailed and all the relevant aspects, such 
as prices, quantities, risk distribution, delivery terms, food and age are negotiated in 
advance (Table 5). The only organizational difference between CAG and the other 
private brands lies in ownership: CTC and Calicarne are the typical hybrid organization 
with long term contracts (quasi-integration), while CAG is the traditional hierarchy. On 
the other hand, vertical integration on the supply chain in Ternera Gallega, Ternera 
Asturiana and Carne de Morucha is hardly non-existent. All transactions are among 
independent companies (stockbreeders, slaughterhouses, distributors and retailers) 
specializing in the different stages of the beef production process and they trust the 
market in order to determine the most important exchange aspects, such as prices, 
quantities and risk (see Figure 2 and Table 4). 
We also observe that contracts are much more detailed and formalized in those brands 
where product homogeneity is sought. For that purpose, we need only to analyze the 
contents of Tables 2 to 6. First, from Table 2, we can conclude that private quality 
signals are more interested in homogeneity than Geographical Indicators. The latter 
focus on those production aspects that encourage high organoleptic attributes, such as 
breed, natural feeding and suckling. Conversely, private quality signals emphasize 
aspects oriented towards product homogeneity. This relationship is not perfect, as we 
observe some differences between CAG and the other two brand names. In this sense, 
CAG does not pay special attention to natural feeding while the others do. This 
exception is explained by the fact that CAG’s competitive strategy focuses more on 
prices and homogeneity than on high quality (manufactured feed is cheaper and yields 
  30high homogeneity). Conversely, CTC and Calicarne pay more attention to this aspect, 
but they do not emphasize other important points for the organoleptic attributes such us 
breed, origin and natural suckling. We could say that they are halfway between 
homogeneity and high quality. Their price strategies are also midway: higher than the 
CAG one and lower than Geographical Indicators prices (see Table 3).  
It is also revealing the differences between each type of brand name with respect to their 
internal procedures. Thus, a series of restrictions and control mechanisms are 
established in production system of all private firms, aimed at achieving producer 
standardization: They allow only a specific type of feed, they establish strict delivery 
terms and the slaughtered animals must belong to a small range of age and weight. The 
companies control, directly or indirectly, phytosanitary products, medications, 
veterinary services and all the stockbreeding and farming materials used in each farm or 
slaughterhouse. On the contrary, producers associated to Geographical Indicators enjoy 
greater discretion, provided that the minimum specifications are met. With the 
exception of minimum quality, there is not any effort or regulation to make the product 
homogeneous among different associated producers for a Geographical Indicator. In 
fact, each associated producer focuses on those attributes that he considers more 
interesting according to his own competitive strategy and provides them at the level it 
suit him best.  
Second, Tables 5 to 6 show for private brands that every aspect relevant for animal 
breeding and fattening (even the specific feeds) is written down in a contract between 
the brand owner and suppliers. The aim is probably to avoid problems of coordination 
that would generate a greater decentralization in situations where the synchronization of 
  31activities is the most important point to achieve product homogeneity. However, neither 
formalized nor detailed contracts are usual for Geographical Indicators (see Table 4). 
Relational or spot contracts predominate although they usually involve long-term 
relationships. They imply establishing commitments for the mechanisms used in 
determining relevant aspects of the transaction, such as prices or conflicts. Thus, high 
power incentives based on the market may be introduced that motivate parties to seek 
the specific information necessary to obtain high quality products. 
As for the second hypothesis, the complementary aspect of quality signals is observable 
only within Geographical Indicators. In them, consumers are assured about quality by 
two names: the public Geographical Indicator and the private brand name of the 
associated producer or distributor. The history and relative importance of public and 
private brand names varies largely across industries. In the case of beef, both types of 
brands are just starting and their relative importance is unclear. In other agrifood 
sectors, public and private brands have a long tradition and are much more developed 
(cheese and wine are the main examples). Whatever their relative importance, the 
simultaneous presence of both kinds of brands for the same product poses a puzzle. The 
willingness of producers to spend resources in developing and maintaining the public 
brand clearly means that products retailed under both brand names obtain a higher price 
premium than products labeled only with a single brand name (see Table 3). According 
to our Table 1, they earn both the quality and the homogeneity premium.  
The explanation for this co-branding is that both brands complement each other: 
geographical indicators guarantee a minimum level of organoleptic attributes and 
private brands guarantee product homogeneity. The role of Geographical Indicators is 
  32also to safeguard the investments made by its own associated producers. To do this, all 
the Geographical Indicators hold exclusive rights to use the geographical name: unless 
the regulatory council expressly authorizes it, nobody can freely use that name. 
Moreover, the Geographical Indicator fulfills a second economic function: control of the 
collective action among associated producers. In this sense, it has been proven that 
Geographical Indicators carry out control tasks over the quality obtained by individual 
associated producers. That is to say, once every producer has agreed on the 
Geographical Indicator characteristics, an organization made up by representatives from 
all sector bodies (the Regulating Council) is responsible for ensuring the 
implementation of that regulation. Thus, it makes it difficult for individual producers to 
expropriate the investments in the reputational capital of the Geographical Indicator, 
historical as well as of the other participants.25 
6. Concluding remarks 
The specialization of brand names in solving different information asymmetry problems 
influences which mechanisms of governance are chosen. If the main problem is about 
average level of organoleptic attributes, the organizational form chosen (Geographical 
Indicators) tends to be more similar to the market than if the problem to be resolved is 
one of homogeneity (private brands), where hierarchy seems to be more efficient. 
Likewise, the type of contractual relationship between the participants in any type of 
                                                                 
25 This is similar to the way co-operatives and professional firms solve their collective action 
problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
  33quality signal differs substantially. More formalization and detail appear in cases where 
greater homogeneity must be achieved than in those where the main variable to be 
assured is the presence of high quality organoleptic attributes. 
The article also shows that Geographical Indicators are not redundant with associated 
private brand names when both are present on the same product. The efficiency of this 
double signaling is driven by the specialization of these two kinds of signals in different 
dimensions of quality. Geographical Indicators seemingly guarantee a high average 
level of quality whereas private signals ensure homogeneity among the different 
products of each specific producer. Furthermore, the organization of Geographical 
Indicators is such that functions are specialized and decision rights allocated among the 
different participating agents to avoid opportunism. This holds mainly for the separation 
of quality control and quality management within the Geographical Indicator. Quality 
control is in the hands of a board (the regulatory council) that also holds residual 
decision rights on the Geographical Indicator. Quality management is the responsibility 
of individual producers.  
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